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In the Supreine Court
of the
State of Utah

CHARLES HINKSON

Respondent,
vs.
CAR~IIN

Appellant's Brief
Case No.

7210
C. BONANNI,

Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The respondent brought an action against the appellant and two other persons for monies alleged to be
owing for commissions on sales of appellant's hosiery.
The complaint is in two causes of action, the first of
which s.eeks five percent commission on all orders of
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appellant's products secured by the respondent; and
the second of which seeks a commission of eighty percent of the sales price on alleged sales of Christmas
merchandise.
In their answer the appellants denied a contract of
employment and admitted that respondent was entitled
to a commission 011 all sales made upon respondent's
solicitation and alleged that such commission had already been paid and that nothing was owing to the respondent. As to the second cause of action the appellant
denied that there was any agreement for eighty percent
commission on any sales whatever. At the close of the
testimony the action was dismissed as to defendants
Joseph Eugene and l\L A. Patreys, and judgment was
given against the appellant substantially as prayed for
in the complaint, judgment being for $1187.50 on the
first cause of action, $692.48 on the second cause of action with interest on each amount and costs .
.STA'TE~IENT OF FACTS
CHARLES HINKSON-DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q. '(By Mr. Wright) How did you first become
acquainted with the company~
A.

Through ''Help Wanted'' Ad in the Salt Lake
Tribune and Telegram. (Tr. 67)

Q.

I want you to relate to the Court any conversation you might have had with Mr. Barton with reference to employment, with reference to your accepting employment with that
company?
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~IR.

BIRD: I object to that, it is incompetent,
irrelevant and im1naterial, and constituting
hearsay, and not binding on the defendants.

THE COURT:

'Yell, the objection is sustained.

:JIR. 'YRlGHT: You may step down for a moment. (Tr. 69)
(Thereupon the deposition of Carmin C. Bonnani
was introduced except certain portions objected to. ('Tr.
71-89) IIinkson was then recalled.)

Q. That is all right, you went in answer to an
''Ad''. And tell us the conversation you had
with him, first who he re'presented, what he
was, and what the conversations were.
l\1R. BIRD : I object to that, being beyond the
agent's authority and not to be measured by
the statement of the agent himself. If it is in
conflict with the statements in the deposition
it is beyond that authority.
THE COURT: H·e may answer. State what conversation was had with Mr. Barton.
A.

He stated himself to be sales manager with
authority to employ and make sales' plan in
virgin territory for and on behalf of the Embassy Hosiery Company. (Tr. 90-9'1)

Q. Wha:t did he say as to the ability of the company to fulfill orders that might be received.
A.

He elaborated on that point; the ability of the
con1pany to fulfill orders and supply these
new accounts because it was a part of his
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plan of sales strategy to open up this western
territory.
H·e said in his elaboration that the company was so big that it could constantly be
a real source of supply and therefore he was
sure that the plan would succeed. ('Tr. 93)

Q. What was said as to the class of merchants
you were to solicit orders from~
A.

He indicated a preference, however, he said
I would have blanket judgment, or in other
words as he elaborated on it further, it was
up to my entire judgment in each condition in
each town, to s·elect dealerships for this long
range· sales planning.
The choice was to be based according to
his preference, stated as a preference, to my
judgment that there it was to be in a suitable location for the nwst volume of buyer
traffic; generally the most reputable store
in the town considered in observation of the
city and inquire as to its popularity in that
trading market; and also to have a reasonaJbly established credit rating of approximately between five and ten thousand dollars as
a minimum in credit rating reference. Or if
it was not a rated account at that particular
time of that particular call I was to recognize that there may be some peculiar situation of credit whjch didn't necessarily really
reflect on the credit of that account, and I
could check further, for example, with banks,
hotel credit men and other merchants in the
city, and upon such inquiry making notation
on my orders I had checked, the company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

could in turn refer to those certain credit
checks.

Q. In calling on dealers trying to make sales, did
you follow those instructions~
A.

I did.

Q.

By calling only on the better class of merchantst

~\.

In each instance.

Q. Do you know whether in any instance you
took an order from anyone that did not have
a rating as specified'
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. How did you handle such accounts'
A. vVhere I could find no rating that seemed
reliable to me in the town I sought out information on which I could base my judgment, such as in some cas·es I went to the
banks or had them themselves give m·e their
references to- those banks and noted those
references on the order as the order was
sign·ed; on other cases I checked with competitive merchants who I happened to meet
in the town, who had been handling that account five years, and I made a note of that
on the purchase order sent in to the company.
In other cases I asked others in other
lines and in hotels.
In other cases where I could find no
satisfactory credit, it was my idea to furnish
the goods, the balance of cash to be on the
basis of C. 0. D. shipment from the company.
(Tr. 97 -99)
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Q.

What were you to be paid for thaU

A.

I was to be paid at the rate of 80% of the
overage fee and 5% of the normal rate. (Tr.
99)

Q.

In making the sale at this premium price, or
overage, did you sell to any merchant merchandise at regular price and sell to others
merc:handise at the extra price~

A.

Not on that date. (Tr.100-101)

Q.

About the first of December, were the orders
you did take s·ent in properly?

A.

Right, sir.

Q. Will you give us the amount of sales you
made to the company~
A.

$38,878.17. (Tr. 106)

CROSS EXAMINATION-HINKSON

Q.

(By Mr. Bird) Now, did you have a reply
on the portion of this telegram which says:
''you decide and answer return wire manner
of handling my co1nn1ission and this bonus
accounting~''

A.

That is right. (Tr. 110)

Q.

Will you state when the telephone conversation occurred~

A.

After November 6th, being the date of this
telegram.

Q.

Where was :Mr. Barton at this

MR. WRIGHT:

time~

If you kno\v.
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A.

I think that was one of his calls from Newark,
N.J. or Denver. (Tr. 111)
Q. So that thereafter you took it from this letter
you were authorized to solicit orders on the
basis of orders on Exhibit''-!''~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But Exhibit •'3' ', the telegrmn, represents the
prices in excess of those, doesn't it~
A. Yes, sir. (Tr. 116-117)
Q. Did you discuss how that premium was to
be divided between you and the company¥
A. Yes, we did.
Q. What was the conversation a;bout that f
A. That the company was entitled to about
twenty per cent; he said he would get an answer on that, and it should be, in his estimation, at least twenty per cent on the basis of
handling such premium accounting.
Q. Now, didn't ~Ir. Barton at that time also say
that whether premium price deliveries would
be permitted was a matter which Mr. Bonanni would have to decide and which he, as
Mr. Barton, could only refer to him, and he
would give you a subsequent answer on that~
A. No, he said he had taken it up with Mr.
Bonanni and that was one of the reasons for
the delay.
Q. But he hadn't taken up the matter of commission?
A. He hadn't taken up the matter of commissions-there was a thought there~fR. BIRD: Just a minute.
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Q.

About a week or ten days after that, you had
another conversation with reference to this
matter, on which nr r. Barton and l\J r. Bonanni were on one end and you were on the
other end, do you remember that telephone
conversation~

A. Could you refresh my memory to the details.
Q. The details-see if you recall this. Isn't it
true that at such a conversation, about two
weeks, or two weeks and three days after
November 6th, 1\ir. Barton, with :Mr. Bonanni
on an extension 'phone advised you he had
discussed the matter of premium sales with
1Ir. Bonanni and had been advised the company was not advised to make any because
it would disturb dealers at list price, do you
remember that conversation~
A. There was a conversation-question about
it, but not a conversation saying it would not
be done.
·
Q. Now, what do you rely on for saying that the
company agreed to pay you eighty per cent
on these overages~
A. On Mr. Barton's say so.
Q. When was that~
A. In his first conversation.
Q. You mean the first time, the very first time
you met Mr. Barton?
A. Not the first conversation about this subject;
this subject even came up in September about
overages.
Q. Just when was this first conversation you
are speaking of~
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A.

At the conclusion of our negotiations for my
employment.
Q. That is before you made sales for the company'
A. Yes.
Q. You say at that time you were allowed to
n1ake sales at premium prices 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And keep eighty percent of the Sales as commission 1
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And on October 6th you say "you are developing some premium accounts at 18, 70, 13.90
and 11.75. You decide and answer return
wire'', that doesn't sound like the matter was
settled 1
A. No, sir.
Q. You said in your first conversation following
the ~ending of this telegram Mr. Barton advised you that the sales could be made, but
the matter of commission was uncertain 1
.A. A little thing yet in the matter of commission.
(Tr. 118-120)
Q. Direct your attention to Exhibit "C" on the
first page of your exhibit you refer to sales
in quotes, and then your sales which you
under-score'
A. Right, sir.
Q. Now, what do you understand a sale to be 1
~fR. WRIGHT: Well-go on.
Q. (By l\fr. Bird) What did you understand in
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your underscoring it here on this Exhibit
"C"~

A. A sale to be a sale.
Q. That would mean an order submitted?
A. Yes.
Q. And approved by the defendants 1
A. An order submitted and a:pproved by thebuyer in my mind is a sale. ( Tr. 121)
Q. Did you understand you were authorized to
make sales on behalf of these defendants and
bind them to make shipments~
A. Right, sir.
Q. They had no right whatever to reject anything you submitted~
A. They had the reservation to reject on lines
of credit.
Q. vVhat was the question on unavailable merchandise~

A.

Q.

No question on unavailable merchandise, except clearance of deliveries; on a delivery
there was no question on unavaila:ble merchandise and I was given notice, even I should
have noticed some of my orders were short,
but I should not worry about that because my
accounts would be taken care of and balance
of the shipment made in those accounts. (Tr.
122)
It is your contention then, when you went to
the customer and had him sign an order for
a given amount of merchandise, you were
authorized to bind the defendants, your employers, to ship that merchandise?
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A. Right, sir. ( Tr. 122)
Q. The next question you write: ''II. You have
listed aceounts in only the amount of $3,947.10
as awaiting credit clearance. Among these are
some of our best, and practically all listed
currently in D-B, or with ready references
noted specifically if not listed.
II A. Question. As an example, why do
~·ou hold up such listed accounts~ and even
~ o. 237 -l- which is clearly noted as C. 0. D.~
In that question you don't question the
right of the defendants to hold up accounts
which don't have good credit, do you 1
A. No, sir.
Q. You only ask why -hold up accounts with good
credit?
A. Yes, sir. (Tr.125)
Q. You don't think for a minute any body is
going to agree to pay you commission on
orders not shipped?
A. If it is a question of orders not shipped it
is better for us to get together before we go
1nuch fa~ther and see why they are not
shipped.
Q. 'That is what I am suggesting.
A. That is the reason of my letter of November
16th.
Q. By reason of the fact the defendant, Mr.
Bonanni, paid you on orders accepted and
not shipped 1
A. Apparently he did on that premise, but up
until November 16th there was no accountable
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Q.

or stated intention to indicate such limitations. (Tr. 126)
Why did you take any further orders on backorder~

A.
•

Because that order may not show on that
date of account, in the second place if they
were going to claim any short accounts on me
for credit, I wanted a specific statement why
and for what reasons, because credit was in
their jurisdiction.
Q. What difference did it make whether it was
refused for credit 1
A. Because that is the only reason they could
refuse them.

Q. What difference did the refusal make?
A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

If it was a question of credit, if they could
substantiate credit of my account was bad
and would jeopardize continued relationship
to them as buyer to seller then I would not
be entitled to commission on that account.
You didn't expect commission on accounts
not accepted by them on account of credit?
Not acceptable for substantial and specified
reasons. (Tr. 128-129)
Now to get back to this Exhibit "3", November 6, 1947, and a week after that you say you
had a conversation with l\tfr. Barton in which
this matter was all cleared in accordance with
your earlier understanding except the exact
matter of commission was left open?
That is right.
Well now, that isn't indicated by Exhibit
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'' B' ', which reads,-dated N ove1nber 16, that
is ten days after,
'· R.efer to the subje-ct wire dated 11/16 to
quote as follows : }\;failing $3,038.00 orders
and samples. Am developing some California orders at $18.70 and $13.90 and
$11.73. You decide and answer, manner
of handling my commissions and this
"bonus accolmting",-all is quoted and
"what about this"'
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

On November 16th you had an uncertaintyT
Had a variable amount of thinking_ whether
it would be ten per cent, twenty per cent, or
fifty per cent of that bonus accounting.
So it wasn't decided until after November
16th7
It was decided, as I said before, up to the
matter of the definite percentage. (Tr. 132133)
And Bonanni reserved the right to ship or
not ship'
Reserved the right with substantial reasoning
on that, as far as I am concerned, in the
agreement with Mr. Barton.
Then your complaint is the reasons given by
the defendant are not substantial'
They aren't even substantiated. (Tr. 1'38-139)

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

Q.
A.

(By l\Ir. Wright)
prices T
$12.90.

I am just trying to get the
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Q. $10.50 you say~
A. $10.75.
Q. $10.75A. $12.90 and $14.50.
Q. And $12.90 and $14.50, and those are the
prices you used at first~
A. Yes sir, those are the prices Mr. Barton instructed me to use. ('Tr. 141-142)
WILLIAM W. BARTON-DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q.

(By Mr. Bird) Is it part of your responsibility to employ salesmen~
A. It is.
Q. To sell merchandise for the Embassy Hoisery
Sales~

A. Yes. ('Tr. 150)
Q. Did you submit a form of agreement to him?
A. Not at that time.
Q. Did you at any time~
A. I did. (Tr. 153)
Q. I hand you document marked Exhibit "8''-is
this the form of the agreement that was submitted to the plaintiff~
A. Yes it is.
Q. At the time you have stated~
A. That is correct.
Q. Except that this one is filled in as to territory
and name and the one you submitted presumably was not filled in~
A. That is correct. (Tr. 153-154)
MR. WRIGHT: Where were you when this Exhibit "8" was tendered to Mr. Hinkson~
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A.

That was in the Newhouse Hotel on the mezannine of the hotel.
Q. (By ~Ir. Bird) After you completed the four
day trip¥
A. That is right, and when I paid him $40.00 for
training.
Q. Vlas there any discussion between you and
him regarding the terms of Exhibit "8"1
A. There was no discussion other than it ought
to be mailed into the office, that was the company policy.
Q. State what conversation you had concerning
Exhibit'' 8'' or the form of this.
A. The base is always seventy-five a week.
:JIR. WRIGHT: NowQ. (by ~Ir. Bird) Just the conversation.
~IR. WRIGHT: What you said to him, and what
he said to you.
A. Well, it apparently follows the usual line; it
is merely read this form and figure it out and
send it into the mill.
Q. (by :Mr. Bird) You had previously discussed
the terms of employment 1
A. Yes, I had the first day I met Mr. Hinkson.
Q. vVhat happened to the form you submitted
Mr. Hinkson 1
A. I do not know.
Q. Do you know whether you ever tendered one 1
A. There was not, we have no file on record.
Q. Have you looked for it 1
A. They have in Philadelphia; of course, I
haven't it.
Q. At the time this contract was tendered to Mr.
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Hinkson, was it in his possession when you
parted company with him Y
.A. It was.
Q. .And all the conversation about it that you remember is what you have s·tated 1
.A. 'That is correct.
MR. BIRD: We renew our offer.
MR. WRIGHT: We object to it, Your Honor.
THE COURT : Well, the Court will admit it at
this time. (Tr. 154-156)
Q. Do you know what the state of the market in
nylon hosiery was in 1947 for the Christmas
business?
.A. Very severe-very severe-very short.
Q. Was there a demand in excess of the supply?
.A. Yes, I had to quit work for two months because of that shortage, personally. (Tr. 159)
Q. You say you were at the offices of the company in the fall of 1947, and that you a\'e
acquainted with the ratio of orders submitted
to your company with the available supply of
hosiery, were you so acquainted?
.A. Yes.
Q. You understand what I mean f
.A. Yes.
Q. What would you say the ratio was of demand
represented by orders submitted, and supply
represented by stocks available 1
.A. The demand was approximately seventy per
cent short,-or the supply was seventy per·
cent short of the demand at that time.
Q. Did you ever communicate that information
to the plaintiff?
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A. I did.
Q. 'Yhen¥
A. Over the telephone ; in reference to the tete~
phone conversation he stated after we received the telegram inquiring· about overage
,,·hich we did not accept.
Q. "'Nas that the first time you discussed with the
plaintiff the available supply of hosiery your
company had'
A. No.
Q. When was the first time 1
A. The first time I talked to Mr. Hinkson.
Q. vVhat did he say about that~
A. Stated to "Jir. Hinkson during the period of
shortage all salesmen would receive drastic
cut in available merchandise that is deliverable against orders taken. It was very easy
to take a large order at that time.
Q. Did you discuss what the situation would be
between that time and Christmas 1
A. I did.
Q. \Vhat was the conversation about that'
A. The conversation was this; we had so much
production, had so many to sell ; every man
was on ratio, to be on his ratio would be 180
to 210 dozen a week.
Q. Did you have a conve·rsation with Mr. Hinkson before he was employed, before.he started
to work for the company with reference to
approval of credit on submitted customers'
orders1
A. I did.
Q. Will you state what that conversation was~
. .\. The conversation was that the company had
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full authority to reject any order on the basis
of credit, and Dunn and Bradstreets confidential reports would not be turned over to
the salesmen. CTr. 160-162)
CROSS EXAMINATION

Q.

(by }rfr. Wright) You say that your company never sold merchandise to anyone at a
premium price~
A. That is correct. (Tr.177)
Q. (by Mr. Wright) I want you to repeat, tell
the conversation you had with Mr. Hinkson
with reference to the credit standard of merchants from whom orders were taken~
A. The· creditMR. BIRD: Now, I object to this unless you can
identify it.
Q. (by Mr. Wright) The conversation you had
with him at the time of his employmenU
A. The agreement was this : that any orders
'submitted to Dunn & Bradstreets without a
very accurate report and a very satisfactory
report would be automatically cancelled by the
company.
Q. I don't understand your answer. Did you say
orders submitted to Dunn & Bradstreets'
A. That is correct, by us for investigation. \Ve
drew a special when in doubt; in that C. 0. D.
there is no repeat potential in that matter.
· (Tr. 187-188)
Q. Tell us how he was to determine then the advisability of calHng on any merchant with
reference to credit T
A. It cannot be done; no salesman can determine
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Q.
~\.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

the desirability of an account even if he goes
to the bank. If a bank carrying a large loan
against that company gives a good statement,
and no salesman is equipped to tell except
Dunn & Bradstreets, and in many cases they
are wrong.
Did you explain that to 1\fr. Hinkson 1
\V e did, that is our authority, we reserve that
strictly. (Tr. 188)
(by :Jir. "\Vright) Now, this written contract
in this form, when did you present that first
to ~Ir. Hinkson 1
That was on the mezannine floor of the N e·whouse Hotel. I also, if I remember correctly,
gave him some notations on approximate sales
ratio on the market for various gauges in the
denirs. I believe that was a conversation and
at the same time paid him $40.00 for training,
that is all at the same time.
The reason I remember it a convention
was on the floor and we used their tables.
I see,-was 1\Ir. Hinkson to be allowed any
!attitude whatever in opening up new accounts
in respect to credit ratings 1
He was not.
Was not1
\Vas not. (Tr. 193)

Exhibit 1-(Deposition of Carmin C. Bonanni)
( 5)

Q. In what capacity does the Embassy Company employ William \V. Barton and in
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A.

(6) Q.

A.

(7) Q.

A.

(8) Q.

what capacity was he employed during
the period, September to December, 1947 Y
William W. Barton is and was at all
times employed by me as a salesman to
sell hosiery for which he receives a commission. He was also authorized to contact other salesmen to sell hosiery on
which sales he would receive an override commission of 10%.
What authority did William W. Barton
have in the employment of salesmen to
represent the Embassy Company in specified territories in the Western United
States during the period, September to
December, 1947~
·
William W. Barton was authorized to
contact other salesmen in the Western
United States, during the period, September to December, 1947. All orders,
from either William W. Barton, or any
other salesman, including Mr. Hinkson,
were subject to my acceptance or rejection. My judgment was based upon the
credit rating of the customers, the availability of merchandise and the use of a
branded name in a particular territory.
Commissions were paid only on those
orders which were accepted by me.
Was the authority of William W. Barton
in employing salesmen specific, or was it
ba:sed upon business practice?
The authority of William W. Barton was
specific and not based on business practice.
During and prior to November, 19+7,
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what was the practice of the Embassy
C01npany in entering· into employer-employee relationships with salesmen whose
service~ were solicited by Mr. Ba:rton 1
.:\. Prior to November, 1947, there were two
other salesmen who were solicited by William vV. Barton, under the same regulations as set forth in Paragraph No. 6.
'Villiam "\Y. Barton would make the contact, notify me and from then on any
dealing·s with the salesmen were as above
stated.
(9) Q. "\Vas "\Villiam W. Barton authorized by

the Embassy Company to employ Charles
Hinkson as a salesman'
A. Yes.
(10) Q. Was Charles Hinkson employed as a

salesman by the Embassy Company in
the Fall of 1947 ~
A. Yes.
( 11) Q. Regardless of the answers to the preceding questions, will you state what representations were made to the Embassy
Company by William W. Barton or by
Charles Hinkson and what statements
were made by the Embassy Company or
any representative thereof to Charles
Hinkson concerning his services in behalf of the Embassy Company prior to
the time the Embassy Company accepted
the first order submitted by Charles
Hinkson.
A. All of any representations to Mr. Hinkson were made by William W. Barton.
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Mr. Barton engaged Mr. Hinkson as a
salesman to solicit orders from customers
for the sale of hosiery. A commission of
5% was paid to Mr. Hinkson on all orders
accepted by me. All orders were subject
to my acceptance. Commissions were not
to be paid on orders which were not accepted.

CROSS INTERROGATORIES
(4) Q. Was there a written contract of employment between William W. Barton and
Embassy Company~ If so, attach a copy
of the same.
A. No.
(5) Q. Was William W. Barton required to secure the approval of his employers of his
selection of salesmen to represent the
company~

A. Yes.

EXHIBIT 3-Western Union
T.KHA1 59 61 DL COLLECT=SAL.T LAKE
CITY UTAH 6 934A
EMBA·SSY HOSIERY CO ATTN
BILL BARTON=
2843 WEST CLEARFIELD BT PHILA=
AM MAILING $3,038. MORE ORDERS RUSH
ORDER PAD AND MORE SAMPLES BLACK
ALSO MISTIQUE ALSO BRONZE AM DEVELOPING SOME CALIFORNIA ORDERS
AT 18.70 AND 13.90 AND 11.75. YOU DECIDE
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AND ANS"\VER RETURN WIRE :MANNER OF
HANDLIXG ~IY COl\Il\IISSION AND THIS
BOKUS ACCOUNTING. ALSO WHERE IS :MY
BALAXCE DUE CO:JL\IISSION MONEY TO
DATE AKD CORRESPONDING STATEMENT.
NEED IT :JIUCH NOW. RUSH==
HINK,SON
Exhibit -1----E~IBASSY

HOSIERY SALES
2843 W. Clearfield Street
Philadelphia 32, Pa.
10/22/47
Mr. Charles E. Hinkson
287 7th Ave.
Salt Lake City 3, Utah
Dear Mr. Hinkson:

15 Den 16.20
51-3012.90
45-30 10.75
white 10.75
no extra
lengths.

We are sending you a check for
orders that have been clHared up to
this date. The balance due you will be
sent you as soon as the orders pass
shipping and credit which will not
take over 10 days. I will at that time
send you a recap on all orders submitted but to save time and get a
check to you I am sending you a
check without a recap. I trust this
will be satisfactory for I have such
a backlog of work that it is the best
I can do at the moment.
To save time ple'ase give the D.
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and B. rating of each account that
you submit.

****
Kindest personal regards,
Sincerely yours
W. W. Barton
Exhibit 8PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT
I, Mr. H. G. Thomas, do hereby accept the
Colorado )
Wyoming ) Western, to be the territories asNebraska )
signed to me for coverage by W. W. Barton.
'The Embassy Hosiery Mills does hereby
agree to pay a comm. of 5% on all sales in the
abov·e mentioned territory, and does also agree
to pay the same comm. for all orders received
through the mail.
****
No order will be held pending credit investigation for more than thirty days.
****
All orders submitted for shipment are subject to a credit 0. K.

****
When a shortage exists Embassy will notify
the salesmen, giving him his quota for the period
of shortage. Where :Mfg. Conditions do not permit
the delivery of the total quantity on order EmSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bassy will have the right to alter said order to
conform with the population ratio.
H. G. Thomas
W. W. Barton
Sales Manager
Embassy Hosiery
Exhibit BHOTEL TRAVELERS
Sac ramen to's
newly furnished
fireproof hotel

·Sacramento 14, Calif.

Aza 1Iahlet, Mgr.
Fifth and J Streets
Telephone 2-9051
11/16

Attn: Mr. Barton or Mr. Bonanni:
Re: Extra Mark-up Sales @ 18.70 and 13.90
etc. Refer to the subject wire dated 11/6 to quote
as follows: ''~failing $3,038.00 orders . . . and
samples ... Am developing some California orders
@ $18.70 and $13.90 and $11.75. You decide and
answer.... Manner of handling my commissions
and this "bonus" accounting.... "
What about this 1
Hinkson
Exhibit CHOTEL TRAVELERS
Sacramento 14, Calif.
Fifth and J. Streets
Telephone 2-9051
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11/15/47
Attn:

Mr. Bonanni:

Gentlemen:
Let's consider several factors deserving your
business-like and surely organized thorough
thought.
II. You have listed accounts in only the
amount of $3,947.10 as awaiting credit clearance.
Among these are some of our best, and practically all listed currently in DB, or with ready references noted specifically if not listed.
IIA. Question-As 'an example, why do you
hold up such listed accounts? and even No. 2374
which is clearly noted as C.O.D.?

****
IV. At hand I have only your one. statement covering only 33 accounts, total as ''pending'' or ''sales''. Even a hasty review, without
aid of my accountant, shows my record to state
that I have sold and forwarded bon~afide orders
for 78 accounts totaling $35,540.51. Will you accept this as evidence of substantial accurate record and accounting~-or will you kindly offer
full and complete statement of your accounting
-to correct these figures if in error and to account
for any difference which may exist ·Wue t.o stated
reasons specifically in e~ach inst.arnce such as due
to "credit" or "back orders ".
V. l\tiay I ask your kind and far-sighted
consideration of the matter of "keeping you men
advised" in such things (not only I, II, III, IY)
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to our n1n tual advantage in the field-as-what
total quantities ca·n be shipped to all ·accownts?
on -what dates? And what ralued exceptions?

••••
Sincerely,
Chas. E. Hinkson
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
The appellant filed objections to the proposed judgment in which were pointed out the errors relied on in
this court (Tr. -!2) These objections specifically attacked the Findings of Fact upon which the judgment
rested. There was no motion for a new trial.
Three arguments are relied on in this court as
ground for reversal or modification of a new trial. (10441-23, UCA, 1943).
1. The court erred in admitting testimony of respondent of statements by appellant's agent inconsistent
with and beyond the authority of the agent.
2. The court erred in making Finding of Fact No.
3 of the First Cause of Action and in giving respondent
judgment for commission on orders taken rather than
on orders approved by appeUant.
3. The court erred in making Finding of Fact No.
2 of the Second Cause of Action and in giving judgment
for respondent on the s~econd cause of action.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TES-

1
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TIMONY OF RESPONDENT OF 'STATEMENTS BY
APPELLANT'S AGENT INCONSISTENT WITH
AND BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE AGENT.
Respondent took the stand in his own behalf and
attempted to testify as to conversations with W. W.
Barton, the alleged agent of appellant. The court sustained an objection to such testimony (Tr. 69). Respondent then introduced portions of the deposition of the
appellant and the appellant introduced the balance of
the deposition after certain deletions had been made.
(Tr. 71-89). Respondent again took the stand and testified over appellant's objections to conversations between
respondent and W. W. Barton relied on as establishing
a contract for commissions in excess of the authority
of Barton as established by the deposition. 'This was
error.
The court correctly excluded testimony of the respondent in the first instance, since a third party cannot
establish the authority of an agent by the uncorroborated
statements of the agent made out of court. ~1echam on
Agency, 2nd Ed. Sec. 285; C.J.S.-Agency, Sec. 322 P.
276; ibid. Sec. 324 (i); Ephraim Willow Creek Ins. Co.
v. Olson, 70 Utah 95, 258 Pac. 216.
Thereupon the respondent introduced independent
evidence of the agent's authority which was the statement of the principal and which established authority
of the agent to employ a salesman on the basis of five
percent commission on all orders approved by the appellant. (Tr. 72, 74, 77). This became the limit of BarSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ton's authority which was a sperific and not a general
authority, and the court illogically per1nitted the respondent to testify to a conversation with Barton going
beyond this specific authority to matters on which there
was no corroboration whatever. Since respondent's testimony was admissible only upon the statement of appellant that Barton ·was his agent, the authority of the
agent must he linrited by appellant's statement, in the
absence of other proof of Barton's authority.
The court's ruling in permitting respondent to testify to his understanding of the employment arrangement
placed appellant, the principal, at the mercy of the third
party (the respondent) with no showing of authority
from the principal. Where a principal employs an agent
with limited authority, this ruling of the court would
permit a third party to bind the principal regardless
of the limitations of authority, upon the third party's
statement of what the agent said. This is contrary to
the law.
In Dohrman Supply Company versus Beau Brummel, )nc., 103 Pac. 2nd 650, 9'9 Utah 188, at page 191,
this court indicated the correct rule:
''One dealing with a supposed agent is under
the duty to ascertain just what his capacity is.
Nelson's representations could not enlarge the
scope of the agency, nor did Nelson attempt to
enlarge his authority. * * * The defendant company was not advised as to the contents of the
telegram but it was its burden to determine just
how great tl1e agf'nry conferred was. Glaus did
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not see the telegram and Glaus acted upon the
assumption Nelson had been made a general
agent. There is no evidence to support this assumption. There was a limited agency."
Mechem on Agency, 2nd Edition, Sec. 285, states:
''Evidence of his own statements, declarations or admissions, made out of court therefore
(as distinguished from his testimony as a witness), is not admissible against his principal for
the purpose of establishing, enlarging or renewing his authority; nor can his authority be established by showing that he acted as agent or that
he claimed to have the powers which he assumed
to exercise.''
The Restatement of Agency supports the same view:
''A statement by an agent as to the extent of
his authority is admissible as evidence of his
power to hind the principal if, but only if, it is
proved that i't was within the scope of his agency
to make the s·tateriient under the rules stated in
Section 144-211, or that it has been ratified. If
such proof is given, his statement becomes an
operative fact creating apparent authority if the
statement by him with respect to the extent of
his authority is not true, and the other party to
a transaction with hin1 does not have notice of
its untruth. The proof that it was within the
scope of the agency to make statements as to the
extent of authority must be made before the statement is admitted, except that it may be admitted
tentatively, in the discretion of the trial judge,
on condition that proof of authority to make the
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statement is later n1ade.'' Sec. 284-d.
"Evidence of a statement by an agent concerning the existence or extent of his authority
is not ad1nissible against the principal to prove
its existence or extent, unless it appears by other
evidence that the making of such statement was
within the authority of the agent or, as to persons dealing with the agent, within the a:pparent
authority or other power of the agent.'' Sec. 285.
'' * • * On the other hand, until it is proved
that the speaker was an agent and that the statement was within his power as such agent, evidence of his statements is inadmissible.* * •.''
Sec. 285-b.
It is admitted that if a principal empowers an agent
with apparent authority a third party can rely on the
apparent authority. In V adner vs. Rozzelle, 45 Pac.
2nd 561, 88 Utah 162, the court made this statement.

''An insurance adjuster is ordinarily a special
agent for the company for whom he acts, and his
authority is prima facie co-extensive with the
business intrusted to him.* * * Within the apparent scope of his authority an adjuster may bind
the principal where the third party knows of no
limitation of such authority.* * * ''.

In the instant case the principal and the agent agree
that the agent had specific and limited authority, which
was established by the deposition before respondent testified and was later confirmed by the agent. This was
made plain from the contract of employment tendered
to the respondent by the agent before respondent under't Services
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took any work in behalf of the appellent. This was
Exhibit "8". ('Tr. 153-156, 191-192). This offered agreement contained these limitations : ''All orders submitted
for shipment are subject to a credit O.K.", and "when
a shortage exists Embassy will notify the salesman giving him his quota for the period of shortage.''
There is no testimony giving Barton apparent authority to go beyond the authority of his principal in
employing a salesman. The evidence is uncontradicted
that in the fall of 1947 unlimited quantities of hosiery
could have been sold without effort because the demand
far exceeded the supply. ( Tr. 159-162). Here the salesman endeavors to commit the principal to commissions
on orders taken regardless of whether sales were made
when such a contract is on its face highly unreasonable.
Can it lie within the power of a fast talking plaintiff
to bind a principal whom he has never met on alleged
conversations with the principal's agent, which the agent
denies, as to rna tters beyond the specified authority of
the agent' The court was apparently prejudiced in favor
of just such a plaintiff against an absent plaintiff who
was said by the plaintiff to be a big concern with lots
of resource·s. (Tr. 9'3).
'The authorities do not permit a principal to be so
mulcted by an ambitious third party who attempts to
hold a principal beyond any authority or apparent authority given to his agent.
2. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDING
OF FACT No. 2 OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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TION AND IN GIYING RESPONDENT JUDGMENT
FOR CO~I~IISSION ON ORDERS TAKE·N R:ATHER
THAN ON ORDERS APPROVED BY APPELLANT.
The deposition of the appellant and the testimony
of his agent, ~Ir. Barton, plainly established the right
of the principal to withhold approval on orders because·
of credit risks. (Tr. 7-!, 77, 187-188, 693, Ex. 8.) It would
be strange to have a principal agree to pay a cmnmission on orders not accepted because of excessive credit
risks. However, if the respondent testified that such
was the contract there is a conflict of testimony which
could be resolved by the court in favor of the respondent,
subject only to the rule that substantial evidence must
support the court.
Respondent admitted in his own testimony that the
appellant reserved the right to pass on credit risks ('Tr.
98, 122, 125, 128-129). And his only argument before
the court was that the rejections of the appellant for
credit reasons were not persuasive with the respondent.
(Tr. 138-139).

It appears, then, that respondent admitted himself
that the 5% commission was subject to approval of credit
and only careless, general statements of respondent support the lower court. Nowhere did he testify that appellant had not reserved right of approval or rejection
for credit. The testimony was not conflicting and the
trial court should not have computed commissions on
orders taken regardless of credit.
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3. T'HE COURT ERRED IN MAKING FINDING
OF FACT No.2 OF THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AND IN GIVING JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
At the close of the plaintiff's case and at the close
of all the evidence appellant moved for dismissal as to
the second cause of action as being unsupported by
eviden0e. The argument is similar to that made under
point 2. If substantial evidence supported the respondent, the court was free to give judgment either way,
hard though it is to believe that a court, subjected through
the business of the court to commercial practices would
give credence to testimony of a salesman that he was
entitled to an eighty percent commission on a common
article such as hosiery while it was in short supply.
Respondent's claim is preposterous on its face. Respondent testified that the regular prices of hosiery were
originally $14.50, $12.90, and $10.75 per dozep. for the
three grades of hosiery. (Tr. 141-142, 166). On the best
grade this price was increased to $16.20 on or about
October 22nd, according to the testimony of both Barton
and the respondent concerning Exhibit "4". CTr. 114,
1'6!6).
Respondent testified that under the second cause of
action he was entitled to an eighty percent commission
on certain premium sales which sales were alleged to
have been made at prices of $18.70, $13.90 and $11.75
per dozen. His concern over these prices, although there
is nothing in the record except respondent's oral testiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mony to support the claim of eighty percent commission,
was evidenced by Exhibit "3" and the respondent's
testimony concerning Exhibit "3 ". (Tr. 167, 118-120,
132-133). That exhibit stated in part:
·· .An1 obtaip.ing some California order~ at
$18.70 and $13.90 and $11.75. You decide and
answer return ''ire manner of handling my commission and this bonus accounting.''
'Vithout producing any answer to this wire the respondent claims he was entitled to an eighty percent
commission on these premiun1 sales. If this commission
were paid the appellant would have received from such
sales net prices of $3.7 4, $2. 78, and $2.35 per dozen
pairs as against net prices of $15.39, $12.26 and $11.16
_ on the highest regular prices with the usual five percent
commission and the so-called ''overage'' price on the
third class of hose remained unchanged at $11.75. Such
a position is utterly unreasonable and particularly when
the appellant was able to sell all of its product without
delay and was constantly behind his orders during the
season when respondent was working. (Tr. 159-162).
The respondent's own testimony falls short of a
contract for a commission on these premium sales, since
he admits that the amount of the commission was left
open.
Hinkson, the respondent, testified that the arrangements for the premium sales were completed except
that the matter of commission was not agreed on:

"Q. Now, didn't Mr. Barton at that time
also say that whether premium price deliveries
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would he permitted was a matter which Mr. Bonanni would have to decide and which he, as Mr.
Barton, could only refer to him, and he would
give you a subsequent answer on that~
"A. No, he said he had taken it up with
Mr. Bonanni and that was. one of the reasons for
the delay.
"Q. But he hadn't taken up the matter of
commission~

''A. He hadn't taken up the matter of commissions-there was a thought there-"
'' Q. You said in your first conversation following the sending of this telegram Mr. Barton
advised you that the sales could be made, but the
matter of commission was uncertain~
"A. A little thing yet in the matter of commission. " ( Tr. 118-120) .
"On November 16th you had an uncertainty¥
''A. Had a variable amount of thinking
whether it would be ten per cent, twenty per cent,
or fifty per cent of that bonus accounting.
'' Q. So it wasn't decided until after November 16th~
''A. It was decided, as I said before, up to
the matter of the definite percentage." (Tr. 132133).
Without proof of the amount of commission there
was no contract for commission and the respondent
would be ·entitled only to the reasonable value of his
services. There was no testimony on reasonable value
and no proof that Appellant made any sales at the overage prices of $18.70, $13.90, and $11.75. (See, for example, Tr. 166, 167, 177-186).
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Since respondent failed to pro¥e a contract for 80%
'· commission the second cause of action failed and Finding No. 2 as to that cause of action was erroneously
made.
CONCLUSION
The measure of the authority of the agent is the
testimony of the appellant as contained in the deposition.
There was no other e¥idence of this authority and without proof of authority or of apparent authority the testimony of Hinkson was erroneously received and Hinkson, the respondent, should not have been permitted to
testify to extra-judicial statements of the agent, Barton,
as a means of establishing the authority of that agent
_ and binding the appellant.
But even if the court consider the testimony of
Hinkson it is plain therefrom that all orders submitted
were subject to approval of credit by the appellant. Any
other arrangement would have been unreasonable and
Hinkson admitted that there was a reservation for credit.
The court should, therefore, either compute the sales
refused by appellant for credit reasons or r·emand the
case to the district court for ascertainment as to thos·e
items.
As to the second cause of action Hinkson's own
testimony falls short of a contract for the sale of Christmas merchandise and an 80% commission. The proposal
is unreasonable on its face, and there is no testimony
to support allowance of either an 80% commission or a
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reasonable compensation. Since respondent failed
prove a contract for an 80% commission, finding of fact
No. 2 in the s·econd cause of action was erroneously
entered and the judgment on the second cause of action
cannot stand.
"
'The judgment should be revers·ed as to the second
cause of action and either modified or remanded for J
new trial to determine r.ejections for credit reasons as '
to the first cause of action.

i

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARDS & BIRD,
Attorr~Aeys for Appellant.
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